[In-person]Controlled Deception for WLAN Attack Disruption and Service Preservation

Controlled Deception for WLAN Attack Disruption and Service Preservation
ID:97 Submission ID:50 View Protection:ATTENDEE Updated Time:2026-10-04 23:39:43 Hits:128 In-person

Start Time:2026-10-13 15:00 (Asia/Ho_Chi_Minh)

Duration:15min

Session:[S3] Track 3: Privacy, Security for Networks » [S3-1] Track 3: Privacy, Security for Networks

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Abstract
IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks (WLANs) expose management exchanges and network identifiers to nearby devices. This information can support reconnaissance, Evil Twin attacks, and management traffic disruption. Wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS) and wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS) can detect or contain suspicious activity but generally leave the adversary’s observable environment unchanged. This paper introduces Controlled WLAN Deception (CWD), a governed framework that coordinates decoys, controlled exposure changes, hardening based on protected management frames (PMF), and quarantine within an authorized WLAN. The controller combines four evidence sources and admits an action only after checking authorization, client compatibility, service impact, finite duration, and rollback availability. CWD Sim evaluates four adversarial objectives across seven defense profiles, using 160 matched trials for each profile. Exact McNemar tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, with Holm correction, assess paired completion outcomes and restricted time to objective (TTO). Under the configured parameters, CWD achieves an objective completion rate (CR) of 22.5%, compared with 73.8% for the baseline, 41.9% for active WIPS, and 35.6% for static deception. Its restricted mean TTO is 341.4 s over a 360 s observation horizon, while false activation occurs in 2.5% of trials. Taken together, the results indicate that CWD can coordinate multiple defensive mechanisms while limiting disruption to legitimate service under the evaluated conditions.
Keywords
cyber deception,IEEE 802.11,moving target defense,WLAN security,wireless intrusion prevention
Speaker
Georgi Iliev
Professor Technical University of Sofia

Submission Author
Viktor Stoynov Technical University of Sofia
Georgi Iliev Technical University of Sofia
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